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Abstract I suggest that the social justice issues raised by
Internet regulation be exposed and examined by using a
methodology adapted from that described by John Rawls in
A Theory of Justice. Rawls’ theory uses the hypothetical
scenario of people deliberating about the justice of social
institutions from the ‘original position’ as a method of
removing bias in decision-making about justice. The ori-
ginal position imposes a ‘veil of ignorance’ that hides the
particular circumstances of individuals from them so that
they will not be influenced by self-interest. I adapt Rawls’
methodology by introducing an abstract description of
information technology to those deliberating about justice
from within the original position. This abstract description
focuses on information devices that users can use to access
information (and which may record information about
them as well) and information networks that information
devices use to communicate. The abstractness of this
description prevents the particular characteristics of the
Internet and the computing devices in use from influencing
the decisions about the just use and regulation of infor-
mation technology and networks. From this abstract posi-
tion, the principles of justice that the participants accept for
the rest of society will also apply to the computing devices
people use to communicate, and to Internet regulation.
Keywords Rawls  Distributive justice  Rights  Social
contract  Internet regulation
Introduction
The structure of the Internet is under greater scrutiny by
users and governments alike as various stakeholders
(including users, Internet service providers, corporations,
and states) attempt to increase their control over it. A few
recent examples illustrate the scale of these debates. Tim
Berners-Lee has recently promoted efforts for citizens of
individual countries to draw up a ‘Bill of Rights’ for Internet
users in their countries (Kiss 2014). Proposals that the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the UN
should play a greater role in Internet governance have been
fiercely rejected by European and North American govern-
ments, among others, due to concerns about how this may
impact on the liberty of Internet users (Cerf 2013). Despite
this, the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration in the US (2014) has announced that it
intends to pass its control over the Internet domain name
system (DNS) to the international community. Finally and
most visibly, the assumptions made by individuals about the
security and privacy of Internet communications and ser-
vices have been challenged by recent disclosures about the
widespread interception and collection of global Internet
traffic by the National Security Agency (NSA) in the US
(Greenwald and MacAskill 2013).
These controversies and incidents show that we are far
from a consensus on Internet regulation. The early dreams
of an Internet free from regulation and control by tradi-
tional governments, powerfully expressed in writings such
as Barlow’s Declaration of the Independence of Cyber-
space (1996), are now long gone. What remains are urgent
questions about how the Internet should operate and how
best to regulate it so that it conforms to our expectations.
I claim that focusing on the characteristics of the
Internet obscures these questions by placing too great an
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emphasis on how the Internet currently operates rather than
considering how it should operate. For instance, calls for
Internet access to be a human right are often ambiguous
about what ‘Internet access’ means in this context. ‘Internet
access’ might be understood as the ability to connect a
computer to a network using Internet protocols, access to
the World Wide Web, or access to a full suite of Internet
applications such as email, web services, online gaming,
and so on. This ambiguity obscures the moral and political
concerns about the communication needs of individuals
and groups, and what restrictions on communicating
information (if any) states and network operators may
legitimately impose. Exploring what our notions of justice
require from information networks may highlight the hid-
den assumptions about users and communication that have
influenced the design and implementation of the Internet
and the tools that utilize it. It also helps to clarify what
exactly is necessary to satisfy a proposed human right to
access the Internet.1
I suggest that the social contract tradition in political
philosophy offers a useful approach to exploring what a
fair and just Internet would look like. Social contract the-
ories use thought experiments of idealized situations where
individuals agree on the terms by which they will form a
society. This agreement is the ‘social contract’ that
describes a just society that has the consent of those who
belong to it. Social contract theories offer an idealized
conception of society that serves as a useful benchmark for
comparing existing societies and social institutions against
them.
For a social contract for the Internet, I will draw on the
social contract theory Rawls presents in A Theory of Justice
(1971). Rawls’ account is highly influential and has
inspired a vast literature exploring its claims and justifi-
cations. Rawls describes a methodology for arriving at an
unbiased agreement on the principles of justice that should
inform the institutions of society. His methodology uses
what he calls the ‘original position’ as its starting point,
where the individuals who must agree on the form society
should take have no knowledge about their individual cir-
cumstances in society. This ‘veil of ignorance’ prevents
individuals in the original position from making self-
interested decisions about society by denying them infor-
mation about who they will be within the society they
design. Rawls argues that for this reason, the individuals
are motivated to ensure that the position of the worst-off in
society will at least be tolerable as there is a chance that
each individual taking part in these discussions could be
one of the worst-off.
Applying social contract theory to issues in Internet
regulation is nothing new. Barlow’s Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace (1996) explicitly states that a
social contract between Internet users should be the means
by which the network is governed. Rawls’ theory itself has
also been used to evaluate issues of social justice in
information technology [for instance, Duff (2006, 2011)
and van den Hoven and Rooksby (2008)]. My approach
here contributes to the literature in two ways. Firstly, it
offers an abstract account of the Internet that removes most
of the details that may obscure or derail discussions of how
information networks should be regulated. Using abstract
conceptions of ‘computing devices’ and ‘information net-
works’ instead of ‘computers’ and ‘the Internet’ addresses
concerns about how specific details of how the Internet and
the systems using it may obscure our thinking about how
they should be used. Secondly, my approach offers an
alternative to basing claims for Internet regulation on
human rights. Claims that access to the Internet should be a
human right are often vulnerable to objections of ‘rights
inflation’, where additions to the broadly accepted set of
human rights risk undermining their value as absolutes.2
My approach avoids these objections by allowing claims
about Internet regulation to be based on a social contract
that all would accept rather than on the human rights of
those involved.
The outline of this paper is as follows. I begin with a
brief description of Rawls’ theory and his method for
eliminating bias in decisions about justice. I then describe
how information technology can be introduced into the
deliberations made behind the veil of ignorance. This step
introduces the concept of ‘computing devices’ and ‘infor-
mation networks’ as aspects of society that need to be
considered in the social contract. The remainder of this
paper discusses the possible outcomes from using Rawls’
principles of justice to guide Internet regulation and con-
siders some objections to this approach.
Rawls’ theory of justice
Rawls’s theory contains a richness and depth that any brief
account of it cannot hope to adequately capture it. At best I
can hope to outline the aspects that are important for my
argument. In essence, Rawls’ theory is based on what he
calls ‘justice as fairness’: fair principles of justice will be
agreed to in fair circumstances where only the relevant
moral and practical reasons will influence the decision
(Rawls 1971). Rawls’ work presents both a methodology
for deciding on the principles of justice that should
underpin society and its’ institutions (the public rules
defining the actions, responsibilities, and expectations of
the various offices that exist within society) and a set of
1 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 2 Cerf (2012) raises this objection, for example.
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principles of justice that he argues would be adopted after
using his methodology. Rawls’ methodology is important
for how it attempts to ensure fairness by removing bias and
self-interest from decision-making about justice.
Rawls’ methodology relies on the concept of a contract
made between rational beings to base his principles of
justice. Instead of looking back to an imaginary past to see
how society might have been formed (as Locke and
Rousseau did in their social contracts), Rawls uses what he
calls ‘the original position’ as a scenario for determining a
just arrangement of society. The original position is
intended to capture the perspective of the ‘noumenal self’,
the ‘‘free and equal rational being’’ who’s decisions are
unaffected by bias and circumstances (Rawls 1971,
pp. 255–256). This concept draws on Kant’s distinction
between the physical body (the phenomenal self) that is
affected by casual laws and the non-physical mind or
rational being (the noumenal self) that is not. Rawls’
methodology does not require this to be an actual distinc-
tion; only that it is possible for someone to adopt this
perspective for the purposes of the thought experiment.
Like the state of nature, the original position is a
hypothetical scenario where individuals devise the contract
by which they agree to form a society and to be bound by
its laws (Rawls 1971). The participants in the original
position act as representatives of those who will live in the
society that will follow the theories of justice and the
political institutions that emerge from their discussion.3
The participants have no knowledge of who they might be
in that society: their individual circumstances and whatever
benefits or disadvantages they may have are unknown to
them. The participants are behind what Rawls (1971) calls
a ‘veil of ignorance’ (p. 12). Hiding this information makes
the participants’ decisions fair and impartial by removing
the sources of prejudice and self-interest that may affect
their judgment (Rawls 1971). This allows the participants
to better fulfill the unbiased perspective of the noumenal
self. Due to this uncertainty about who they might be
outside of the veil of ignorance, the participants will agree
on a theory of justice that offers the best circumstances for
the worst-off in that society, as they could be one of the
worst-off themselves. The combination of the original
position and the veil of ignorance serve to make the
interests of the worst-off the interests of everyone, as any
of the decision makers could belong to this group once the
veil is lifted and they enter into the society they have
developed.
To guide the participants in their decision-making,
Rawls (1971) introduces the concept of primary goods,
which he describes as things any rational person would
want, regardless of what her goals for her own life are. The
more primary goods someone has, the likelihood that she
can achieve her own life plan increases, and so a rational
person will prefer institutions where she has more primary
goods instead of less. Primary goods include rights, liber-
ties, powers, opportunities, wealth, income, and self-
respect. The participants in the original position each seek
to ensure that they will possess as many primary goods as
they can. The possibility that they themselves might be the
worst-off in society motivates the participants to ensure
that the principles of justice and the institutions of society
provide the worst-off with acceptable amounts of primary
goods.
As a result of the deliberations carried out in the original
position, the participants will have to choose between
different principles of justice that will serve as the foun-
dation for how the institutions of their society should be
arranged. Rawls (1971) argues that the participants in the
original position will settle on the following principles of
justice:
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compat-
ible with a similar system of liberty for all.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,
consistent with the just savings principle, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity
(p. 302).
These two principles can be called the Principle of
Equal Basic Liberties and the Difference Principle
respectively.4 The basic liberties described in the first
principle include the rights to vote and be eligible to run for
public office, freedoms of speech and assembly, freedoms
of conscience and thought, freedom of the person, the right
to own private property, and freedom from arbitrary arrest
and the seizure of possessions (Rawls 1971). These prin-
ciples are then used to evaluate the institutions within that
society.
How might the Internet be represented within the
framework of primary goods and Rawls’ principles of
distributive justice? As Duff (2011) notes, several authors
have argued that information should be added to the list of
primary goods given by Rawls. For example, van den
Hoven and Rooksby (2008) propose access to information
as a primary good, which they define as ‘‘a level of access
3 For the purposes of this paper the representatives in the original
position can be thought of as specific individuals who will inhabit the
society created through the social contract they develop.
4 Whether adopting the methods of the original position and the veil
of ignorance will necessarily lead us to these principles of justice are
questions I will not address here.
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to an informative object such that that access would be
sufficient to produce knowledge’’ (emphasis in original) (p.
381). Access to information allows individuals to gain the
knowledge necessary to devise and perform their own life
plan. van den Hoven and Rooksby (2008) also rightly argue
that access to information should be classified as a basic
liberty, and so should be distributed following the Principle
of Equal Basic Liberties. This also permits some limita-
tions on the information can access, if those limitations
permit everyone to enjoy the same liberties. For instance,
the liberty to hold property is limited by the restriction that
you cannot arbitrarily take what someone else owns away
from them, otherwise there is an unequal liberty in holding
property (since you can keep yours and she cannot keep
hers). Similarly, van den Hoven and Rooksby (2008) state
that an equal liberty to access information can be con-
strained by privacy protections for personal information
and restrictions on the use of intellectual property.
Opportunities to access information can be also dis-
tributed according to the Difference Principle (van den
Hoven and Rooksby 2008). In this context, this means that
inequalities in access to the Internet are permissible only if
they to the benefit of the worst-off in society. Combining
this with the Principle of Equal Basic Liberties, this pro-
poses that everyone should have an equal liberty to access
the Internet, while permitting inequalities in how it is
accessed provided that everyone benefits from permitting
these inequalities.
The four-stage sequence
Rawls recognizes that a gap exists between formulating
general principles of justice and the laws and regulations that
implement them in society, and offers a four-stage sequence
to overcome this gap. This sequence gradually introduces
further information to those behind the veil of ignorance, until
finally all information is revealed and the participants dis-
cover their actual circumstances within society.
Rawls (1971) distinguishes between three kinds of facts:
social theory from first principles (which are all that is
available in the original position), general information
about a particular society, and specific information about
individuals. The second and third kinds of facts are grad-
ually revealed as the four-stage sequence progresses.
The four-stage sequence consists of:
1. The original position. Only general social theory is
made available to the participants, allowing them to act
as their ‘noumenal selves’ by removing potential
sources of bias in their decisions (Rawls 1971,
p. 255). This stage was explained in the previous
section.
2. General information about the society is now revealed
to the participants. This stage serves as a constitutional
convention where the participants act as delegates to
decide on a just political constitution that reflects the
principles of justice agreed upon in the first stage.
3. This is the legislative stage where laws are proposed
that implement the decisions made in the constitutional
stage. The participants here act as legislators who
evaluate laws and policies in light of the principles of
justice accepted in the first stage and the constitution
accepted in the second. Rawls (1971) states that the
representatives can move between the constitutional
and legislative stages to resolve problems that emerge.
4. The judicial stage makes all relevant information
available to the participants. The participants act as
judges and administrators who apply the laws and
policies accepted in stage 3, and as the citizens who
abide by them (Rawls 1971).
A brief example should help to illustrate how this pro-
cess works. As discussed in the previous section, the par-
ticipants in the original position decide on a set of
principles that will judge the society will create. For the
sake of the argument, I will assume that they select Rawls’
two principles of justice. Now that this is decided, the
discussion moves to the second stage, the ‘constitutional
convention’. While the participants are still unaware of
who they might be within society, they are now informed
of their society, such as the natural resources available to it
and the level of economic development (Rawls 1971). With
this information, they can begin to formulate how the
requirements of justice already decided upon can be
implemented given the resources available to their society.
As a result, they devise a constitution for their society that
will serve as the benchmark for the legislative and judicial
stages that follow.
The legislative and judicial stages are similar to how
laws are written and revised in constitutional govern-
ments.5 The constitution serves as the basis for the laws
and judicial decisions in society. If serious issues emerge
between the principles of justice and the laws that follow
the constitution emerge, the constitution itself may be
amended to better reflect what the principles of justice
require.
5 An idealized view of the relationship between the constitution of
the United States, the laws of the US Government, and the decisions
of the US Supreme Court is a helpful analogy to keep in mind here.
The government can impose laws which the Supreme Court may find
unconstitutional if they are challenged, and amendments to the
constitution are possible if there is political agreement on the need to
do so.
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Introducing information technology into the four-stage
sequence
I propose that an abstract description of information tech-
nology should be introduced in stage 2, with more specific
information about it introduced in stages 3 and 4 as nec-
essary. First the significant features of information tech-
nology need to be defined. This description needs to be
general enough so it does not presuppose arbitrary features,
but not so general that it does not allow us to make useful
decisions about how it should governed and regulated. The
primary good of access to information that van den Hoven
and Rooksby (2008) present is an excellent starting point to
which abstract concepts of the Internet and how we access
it can be added.
The phrase ‘information technology’ itself provides a
starting point: it involves artefacts that deal with storing,
transmitting, and presenting information to those who uti-
lize them. Such artefacts might store information by
recording it in a form from which it can be retrieved later,
transmit it by conveying it to another artefact that might
store, transmit, or present it, or present information in a
way intelligible to the user of the artefact. Not every
artefact covered by the term information technology will
have all of these attributes: a telephone line transmits
information, but does not by itself store or present it (these
functions would be fulfilled by sound recorders and tele-
phones, in this case).
What makes computers different from the information
technologies that preceded them is their capacity to act
upon instructions given to them (i.e., their capacity to be
programmed and to perform computation). Computers can
control the information they store, transmit, and present
according to the instructions contained in their program-
ming. This creates the possibility of such devices per-
forming actions without the user’s knowledge. If even the
scale and complexity of the software running on modern
computing devices is ignored, suggesting that users have
complete knowledge of what the computing devices they
possess are doing and how it will respond to transmitted
instructions from other devices via a network places a
heavy burden on the user. It is more realistic to claim that
the device may act in ways in which the user is unaware.
This claim can be phrased as the possibility that a com-
puting device may store and transmit information that she
is aware of.6
The transmission of information requires a medium
through which the computing devices can communicate.
This medium is represented as an information network: a
series of connections between devices that allows for
information to pass between them. The information
accessible to a computing device is significantly limited if
it does not have access to such a network. At best, such a
device can access and present information that the user can
physically input into it via physical storage media (such as
portable hard drives, compact discs, flopping disks, cas-
settes, and so on). Connecting to an information network
expands the range of information accessible to any given
device significantly. It also creates greater opportunities for
others to gain access to the information on a user’s device.
Someone can only access the information stored on an
unconnected device if she has physical access to it,
increasing the likelihood that the user knows that the data
stored on it has been accessed (and by whom). The
accessibility of the information stored on a connected
device will depend on the programming of the device and
whether there are any safeguards that prevent information
from being shared with any other computing device that
attempts to access it. This possibility increases the risk of
the user’s privacy being invaded.
The complexity of the software running on modern
computers and the scale of computer networks are just two
examples of how information technology is a social prod-
uct: it is not the work of isolated individuals but the result
of the social organization and co-operation necessary to
create and maintain it. This brings information technology
into the realm of distributive justice as something that the
distribution of can be controlled by society. The usage and
distribution of information technology should reflect the
same notions of justice that guide the rest of society.
An objection here is that information networks do not
necessarily have to be social products and thus subject to
the requirements of distributive justice. Anarchistic net-
works made up of uncoordinated individuals are an alter-
native possibility. Wireless mesh networks are a means of
forming and maintain an unplanned network along these
lines, for example (Akyildiz et al. 2005). This objection is
correct in noting the possibility that public information
networks are not an inevitable outcome of having net-
workable computing devices. I see two responses to this
objection. Firstly, the technology and resources necessary
to create private networks will be result of developing
public network infrastructure, as suggested by the history
of the Internet’s development. This is a contestable claim,
especially given how many uses of the Internet have
emerged through private developers, and it is vulnerable to
the response that an equivalent to the Internet could have
emerged through private, uncoordinated means. The sec-
ond, and perhaps more convincing response, is to suggest
that the principles of distributive justice discussed here
would be useful if the private individuals who create such a
6 It could not, by definition, present information that the user is
unaware of. Presentation necessarily involves making someone aware
of whatever is being presented. Whether it is understood is another
matter.
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network themselves decide to make it accessible to others.
These principles maintain their value as a guide for
deciding how formerly private resources that are granted to
society at large can be fairly accessed and distributed.7
From these general points about information technology
we can along with the other information supplied in stage
2, the participants are given the following description of
information technology:
1. Each individual may possess one or more computa-
tional devices that she uses to access and store
information. (These are computing devices).
2. The information stored on these devices may be
transmitted to other computing devices via a network.
(Such networks are information networks).
3. The actions described in points 1 and 2 may occur with
or without the knowledge of the possessor of the
computing device.
4. Computing devices and information networks are
products of social co-operation.
This definition contains the points that computing
devices store and present information, and information can
be transmitted between them via a network. It also states
that users may be unaware of the information that their
devices are storing and transmitting. The breadth of this
description captures the significant aspects of these devices
without confining it to the particular features of specific
devices that are in use. This prevents the particular char-
acteristics of specific devices and networks from influ-
encing the decisions of those behind the veil of ignorance.
It is irrelevant at this stage whether these devices are
desktop PCs, laptops, tablets, or smartphones. While these
devices differ significantly in their capabilities, the issues
of justice concerning the use of the information they
access, store and transfer remain the same at this point.
An immediate objection is that this description of
information technology is abstract to the point of vacu-
ousness. This objection claims that by refusing to define
these devices in anything but the vaguest of terms, my
account loses what is important about information tech-
nology from the perspective of social justice. My response
is that this vagueness is necessary to avoid implicit bias in
the decisions made about how we should use information
technology. Historical accidents and arbitrary choices
dominate information technology: the choice of ‘big-en-
dian’ or ‘little-endian’ byte ordering (Tanenbaum 2006),
the ubiquity of the concepts originating in the Unix oper-
ating system (Lanier 2010), even the QWERTY keyboard
layout, to name just a few. The insights from disclosive
ethics about how implicit biases affect the design of arti-
facts also suggest that we should be cautious in identifying
particular aspects of information devices as necessary and
non-arbitrary (Introna 2011). As the deliberations at this
stage are intended to serve as the basis for a constitution,
there should be as few assumptions made about the char-
acteristics of information technology as possible. More
specific information about the form these devices and
networks take can be introduced in stages 3 and 4 where
such details are necessary for drafting legislation and
implementing law.
My reasoning for including information devices and
networks in stage 2 rather than in stage 1 (the initial ori-
ginal position) is modesty about the role of information
technology in society. The changes information technology
makes to society are notoriously difficult to predict, as a
casual glance over the historical literature on how com-
puters will affect society will confirm. This will be
unconvincing to anyone who considers information tech-
nology to be a radically disruptive force in society. If this is
the case, information about devices and communication
networks will have to be included in stage 1 of the delib-
erations, joining the other fundamental facts about society
that Rawls considers necessary for meaningful yet unbiased
decisions.
I do not wish to claim that this is not the only such
description of information technology that could be pre-
sented to participants at the second stage of Rawls’ four-
stage sequence. I do suggest, however, that any such a
description must share the broad characteristics of the
account I have developed here: that ‘information devices’
are capable of recording, storing, and transmitting infor-
mation across a network, such devices are the result of
social cooperation and are not necessarily possessed by
every individual within society, and that such devices are
capable of performing these actions both with and without
the knowledge of whoever possesses them.
From information networks to the Internet
How do these concepts of information devices and net-
works translate into policy on the Internet? As the delib-
erations move to stages 3 and 4 of the sequence, we can
begin to distinguish between different kinds of information
devices and networks and consider whether different forms
of regulation are appropriate for them.
With Rawls’ principles of justice in mind we can reach
some general conclusions about what justice requires from
information technology. Computing devices and informa-
tion networks should encourage the acquisition of primary
goods, or at least should not undermine the user’s posses-
sion of such goods. The access to information networks
that information devices expand the possibilities for each
individual’s access of information and her ability to7 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection.
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produce knowledge. The information stored by these
devices and conveyed across these networks should be in
accord with the rights individuals possess, and should
follow the Principle of Equal Basic Liberties. As these
devices are capable of revealing information about their
user to others, the participants will want to have control
over what information these devices may reveal about
them. As access to information is a primary good, indi-
viduals will want their devices to be open to receiving
information. Such information will also assist them in
pursuing their own life plan. Information networks should
similarly promote access to information. The rules gov-
erning the information exchanged by their devices will also
conform to the social institutions that they have devised for
the rest of society. From this position, the institutions that
govern the exchange of information between computing
devices should be just.
From this we can derive a definition for what a just
information network requires:
A just network allows for accessing and exchanging
information in ways that support the primary goods of
those who use it and are in accordance with the
principles of justice.
And similarly, for the devices used to access an informa-
tion network:
Computing devices must allow users to control
information in ways that are consistent with their own
conception of the good and are in accordance with the
principles of justice.
The vagueness of these definitions is appropriate for stage
2 (the constitutional stage) of the deliberations, as they can
be refined into specific legislation and policies in the
following stages. Like the principles of justice, they serve
as guidelines for drafting and revising the more specific
policies that will emerge when more information is
revealed to the participants in this decision-making
process.
The participants would also seek to address the prob-
lems raised by the additional uncertainty over whether they
will possess an information device in society. (Recall that
point 1 of the abstract description of information technol-
ogy states that ‘‘Each individual may possess one or more
devices’’). This forces the participants to address the
inequalities raised by the ‘digital divide’ between those
who have access to information technology and those who
do not. These concerns are addressed by the requirements
that access and use of information devices and networks
must follow the principles of justice. If possessing infor-
mation devices and access to information networks are
desirable, the worst-off in society will now be the worst-off
group in society envisioned in stage 1 (the original
position) who additionally do not possess information
devices. The participants will therefore be motivated to
ensure that the disadvantages of belonging to this group
will not be intolerable.
The constitutional stage (stage 2) appears to reflect what
the World Wide Web Foundation (n.d.) is promoting with
its’ ‘Web We Want’ campaign, where individuals are
encouraged to come together to discuss how the Internet
should be regulated. I suggest that adopting a methodology
similar to the one I have described would be a useful tool
for assisting these deliberations, especially as a method of
reassuring non-participating stakeholders that self-interest
is not motivating the participants’ decisions.
There is a major objection to using Rawls’ methodology
that I must address: that Rawls’ scope for social justice
does not include international justice, which would be
necessary for addressing concerns about Internet regula-
tion. Rawls confines this methodology to determining jus-
tice within a society, rather than between different
societies. It operates only on a national rather than an
international level. Rawls (1985) himself states that his
theory of justice for institutions is applicable only to
‘‘modern constitutional democracies’’ (p. 224). This is a
significant problem for using this method to examine
questions of justice about the Internet given the interna-
tional issues it raises.
Rawls’ methodology can be adapted to address this
problem, and many authors have used Rawls’ framework
as a starting point for developing theories of international
justice (Blake and Smith 2013).8 For issues about inter-
national Internet regulation, the participants would be
representatives of the populations of individual countries
but without any knowledge of which country they are
representing. They will be given information about the
general circumstances and social norms of individual
countries, as well the relative inequalities in wealth and
influence of different countries. The worst-off group would
then be the people of the most-disadvantaged country.
There remains the problem of governments that disagree
with the liberal assumptions that underpin Rawls’ theory
and his conception of primary goods and basic liberties.
While making the participants representatives of the pop-
ulations instead of the governments of different countries
may offer a partial solution where government policies do
not reflect the wishes of their people (i.e., governments that
rely on the use or threat of force to remain in power), it
does little to resolve this problem if the population shares
their illiberal views. The concept of ‘overlapping consen-
sus’ that Rawls (2005) develops in his later work Political
8 Rawls (1999) himself describes a different approach to international
justice in The Law of Peoples. I will not discuss it further here due to
limited space and scope.
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Liberalism offers a possible response to this problem.
Overlapping consensus seeks acceptance of the institutions
themselves and how they operate from a variety of per-
spectives (Rawls 2005). While the controversies concern-
ing Internet regulation suggest that such consensus will be
difficult to reach, nonetheless it offers a method for
countries and groups with diverse political and social
commitments to find common ground despite their
differences.
Conclusion
In this paper I outlined how Rawls’ theory of justice can be
applied to questions about the just regulation of informa-
tion networks. I argued that the abstract conception of
information technology described here used in conjunction
with Rawls’ theory removes concerns about how the
practical details of technology obscures our thinking about
how networks such as the Internet should operate. Using an
abstract approach such as the one presented here helps us to
use what we have learned from the history of the Internet
and the development of information and communication
technology to inform our thinking about how they should
operate rather than confining it.
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